THE INTERPENETRATION OF NARROW
CONSTRUCTION AND POLICY: MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS' CIRCUIT OPINIONS

Judicial conduct can be understood not only by examining trends
within the law but also by reviewing words and actions of individual justices. An in-depth analysis of a particular justice may be
the most accurate way to reconcile past and present positions while
predicting future decisions.' As Professor Fuller stated:
The object of research conducted along these lines would seem to
be not so much to measure the influence on his decisions of the
judge's personal beliefs and attitudes, but to discover what Ihering
called "latent rules,"2 that is unexpressed rules that actually govern
the judicial process.
Our purpose in examining Justice Stevens' opinions while he sat
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is more limited. We seek
only to identify those themes and concerns which permeate his opinions. Although our approach grows out of the realist school of criticism, 3 for two reasons we limit ourselves to the veneer of reality
1. Rodell, For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing,
50 GEO.L.J. 700, 701 (1962).
2. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HAzy. L.
REv. 1604, 1614 (1966) (footnote omitted).
3. See B. CAnwozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 59-70 (1924); B. CARDozo,
THE NATURE OF THE JuDicrAL PRocEss 112-15 (1921); L. FULER, Tns LAW
IN QUEST OF ITsELF 53-55 (1940); Frank, Are Judges Human? (pts. 1-2),

80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 223 (1931); Massaro, "Fortascast." Dark Clouds
over PresidentFord's ForthcomingSupreme Court Nominations, 34 FED. B.J.
257, 265 (1975); Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pts. 1-3), 36 HARv.
L. REV. 641, 802, 940 (1923); Shuler, Realist Needles in a Positivist Haystack: A Study of Attitudes Operative in the Decisions of Supreme Court
Justices,32 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 1, 1-5 (1974). See also Steiner, Judicial
Discretionand the Concept of Law, 35 CAlvi. L.J. 135 (1976). But cf. Hall,
IntegrativeJurisprudence,27 HASTINGs L.J. 779, 784-85 (1976).
Our method was rudimentary. We read all Justice (then Judge) Stevens'
opinions, including per curiam decisions. Next, we classified each opinion
by subject. Then we noted the presence or absence of the following factors
in each decision: length of the opinion, disposition of the trial court or administrative decision, plaintiff or defendant, number of issues discussed, relative importance of the facts to the question presented, source material reJuly 1976Vol. 13 No. 4

represented by Justice Stevens' opinions: The opinions are accessible,4 and the Justice has indicated that his prior decisions are prelied upon, votes of other judges in relation to Justice Stevens, scope of the
opinion, justificatory method utilized, avoidance techniques used by Justice
Stevens, importance of stare decisis, any comments on the function of the
judiciary, relative deference to political institutions, importance of technique in relation to policy, Justice Stevens' concern for judicially manageable standards, any self-conscious discussion by Justice Stevens concerning
the role of the judge. Finally, we placed each decision within one of four
rough categories: naturalism (Mr. Justice Frankfurter was the model),
realism (judges evaluate legal precepts by their contribution to the welfare
of society), legal positivism (Mr. Justice Black), socio-legalism (Mr. Justice
Cardozo).
We acknowledge that the schema was crude and subjective. However,
independent verification of our analysis is available. This Comment was
written prior to the publication by Vanderbilt University of a special student project reviewing Justice Stevens' opinions. Nevertheless, our conclusions are in substantial agreement with their work. See Special Project,
The One Hundred and FirstJustice: An Analysis of the Opinions of Justice
John Paul Stevens, Sitting as Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, 29 VAZo. L. REv. 125 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Special Project).
4. For a complete list of decisions in which Judge Stevens participated
and a brief topical description, see P. Gormley, P. Morgan, K. Ronhovde,
Compilation of Reported Decisions of the 7th Circuit in which Judge John
Paul Stevens Participated, Oct. 14, 1970-November 25, 1975, December 9,
1975 (The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service), in Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-183
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
The following cases were decided by Justice Stevens subsequent to the
compilation in the Hearings. Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prod., 529 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (torts); Stevenson v. Mathews, 529 F.2d
61 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (prisoners); Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528
F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (immigration); Feed Serv. Corp. v.
Kent Foods, Inc., 528 F.2d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part) (patent infringement); Fitzmans v. Jersey State Bank, 528 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (contracts). See Special Project 199-209
for a list of decisions which "the compilers considered of potential interest
to practitioners and scholars ....

" Id. at 199 n.*.

In total, Justice Stevens participated in 542 decisions. We read the 289
opinions which Justice Stevens wrote: 161 (30%) majority, seventy (13%)
per curiam, forty (7%) dissent and eighteen (3%) concurrence. Justice
Stevens wrote in 53 percent of the decisions in which he participated.
In addition, we examined the following secondary source material written
by the Justice: Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in MR. JusricE 318 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds. rev. ed. 1964); Stevens, Exemptions from Antitrust,
37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 706 (1968); Stevens, Symposium-Regulated Industries and Antitrust, Introductory Remarks, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST LJ. 215
(1967); Stevens, Antitrust and the Regulated and Exempt Industries, The
Regulation of Railroads, 19 A.B.A. SEcTioN ANTITRUST L. 355 (1961);
Stevens, Cost Justification,8 ANTITRUST BULL. 413 (1963); Stevens, The Office of an Office, 55 Cm. B. Rzc. 276 (1974); Stevens, The Robinson-Patman

Act Prohibitions,38 Cm. B. REc. 310 (1957); Stevens & Johnston, Monopoly
or Monopolization-A Reply to ProfessorRostow, 44 ILL. L. REv. 269 (1949);
Stevens, Book Review, 28 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 430 (1953); Stevens, Book Review, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 384 (1952).
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dictive of his future conduct. 5
Considered in isolation the opinions present a severely fragmented view of the Justice's personal approach to decisionmaking. 6
A myriad of factors constricts the expression of individual beliefs
on the bench: the quality of the bar which shapes the issues, 7 a
collegial court which requires the accommodation of other judgments, s the advocatory nature of an opinion, 9 the inability to articulate the reasons for a decision, 10 and the avoidance of personal
statements. Within these restrictions, this Comment will examine
Justice Stevens' approach to documentary construction and discern
his attitudes toward constitutional decisionmaking.
INTRODUCTION

A detailed analysis of Justice Stevens' career as an appellate
judge must be preceded by general remarks about his apparent
style as a decisionwriter. Justice Stevens dislikes to be rigidly classified," but his general judicial philosophy seems to be one of re5. Hearings 43.
6. Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes Toward FederalAdministrative
Agencies, 14 VA=i. L. REv. 473, 483 (1961).
7. Schaefer, Good Judges, Better Judges, Best Judges, 44 J. Am .

JuD.

Soc'Y 22, 23 (1960).

8. Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 480.

9. Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W.L.
REV. 361, 455, 461 (1970); Lewis, Phase Theory and the Judicial Process,
1 CAur. W.L. REV. 1, 32 (1965).
10. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 38 (1931).

11. Hearings 32. Even so, Justice Stevens' biography discloses his primary interest in antitrust. Born: April 20, 1920, Chicago, Illinois. Marital

status: Married, wife-Elizabeth Jane Sheeren-four children. Education:
1937-41-University of Chicago, A.B. degree; Phi Beta Kappa, and 1945-47Northwestern University, School of Law, J.D. degree, magna cum laude,
Order of the Coif, Co-Editor Illinois Law Review. Military Service: 194245, United States Navy, Lieutenant. Experience: 1947-48-Law Clerk to
Mr. Justice Wiley Rutledge, United States Supreme Court; 1948-51-1952-

Associate, Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Raymond (now Jenner &
Block), Chicago, Illinois; 1950-Associate Counsel, Sub-Comnnittee on Study
of Monopoly Power, United States House of Representatives; 1950-54Lecturer on Antitrust Law, Northwestern Law School; 1954, 1955-58-Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School; 1952-70-Partner, Rothschild, Stevens, Barry & Myers (formerly Rothschild, Stevens & Barry; Rothschild,
Hart, Stevens & Barry); 1970-75-United States Circuit Judge, 7th Circuit
and 1975 to present-Justice, United States Supreme Court. Bar: 1949, Illinois. Memberships:

Attorney General's National Committee to Study the

Antitrust Laws; Chicago Bar Association:

1960-61-Chairman Antitrust

straint in the neutral 12 application of positive law or precedent to
the facts before him. Justice Stevens avoids policy decisions except
when interstitial 13 gaps in the law require a decision and rarely
Law Committee; 1961-62-Chairman Committee on Candidates; 1963-65Board of Managers; 1969-Chairman Committee on the Judiciary; 1970Second Vice-President, Federal and American Bar Association. Counsel to
the Special Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Illinois to investigate the integrity of the judgment in People v. Isaacs (1969), which
resulted in the resignation of two Illinois Supreme Court justices.
This biographical sketch is based on information provided by Judge Stevens' law clerk and from Hearings3.
12. See generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1959), reprinted in H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITIcs, Am FUNDAMENTAL LAW 4 (1961), and H. WECHSLER, SELECTED ESSAYS
1938-62, at 463 (1963). But see generally L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-

30 (1958).
13. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 69 (1921).
E.g., Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 105 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3, 29 (1960).
In sum, a quick understanding of Justice Stevens may be obtained by
realizing he relies upon the opinions of Mr. Justice Rutledge, Mr. Justice

Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Harlan (the younger). This conclusion is
based on our notation of every justice whom Justice Stevens cited by name.
See methodological discussion supra note 3.
The impact of Justice Rutledge is derived from Justice Stevens' work as
a Law Clerk for the Justice and (then) Mr. Stevens' commentary on Justice
Rutledge. See notes 4, 11 supra; note 94 infra.
In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972), affirmed a thirty-day criminal
contempt sentence for defendant's failure to stand for either judge or jury.
In dissent, Justice Stevens drew upon Justice Frankfurter's definition of the
law:
Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner
life of man. It rests in large measure upon compulsion.... The
consent upon which free government rests is the consent that comes
from sharing in the process of making and unmaking laws. West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 468 F.2d at 140 n.11.
Justice Stevens is perhaps most willing to follow the lead of Justice Harlan (the younger). In Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1972), the
court held that absent an intelligent waiver or the conclusion by counsel
that the case is frivolous, the state is constitutionally required to protect
the petitioner's right to appeal. Rather than rely on the majority opinion's
equal protection analysis in Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), Justice Stevens shifted to Justice Harlan's concurring (id. at 485) due process rationale.
Justice Stevens has stated he will give greater weight to opinions by Mr,
Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Judge Hastings of the Seventh
Circuit. Hearings 40, 31. But we have not discerned the same degree of
ideological reliance upon these judges as upon Justices Rutledge, Frankfurter, and Harlan.
Professor Hart is the only jurisprudential scholar whom Justice Stevens
has cited. See Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 88 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974), reh'g,
489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973). Compare H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961) and Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAv.
L. REv. 593 (1958), with L. FULLER, THE MORAIrTY OF LAW (1969) and Fuller,
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reaches constitutional issues. He would limit the federal judicial
function 14 by deciding cases on justiciability grounds 15 or in accordance with extant precedent 6 rather than expanding the federal
law. In his words:
[I]t is the business of a judge to decide cases that come before him.
From time to time, in the process of deciding cases, important decisions are made and the law takes a little different turn from time
to time. But it has always been my philosophy to decide cases
on the narrowest ground possible and not to reach out for constitutional questions. I think that is the tradition, that is the finest tradition of the work of the Supreme Court and I think the Court is
most effective when it does it own business the best.'7
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAv. L.
REv. 630 (1958).
14. Hearings 42, 50. See Rydell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Judicial SelfRestraint, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 875, 909 (1975). The remainder of the paragraph draws upon Mr. Rydell's definition of a judicial conservative.
Justice Stevens has expressed concern that his rate of dissent, 7 percent (supra note 4), might be viewed as abnormally high. He attributes
the apparent abnormality to a general proclivity in the Seventh Circuit to
express even the most minimal disagreement. Hearings 41. In fact, Justice
Stevens' level of dissent is 3.9 percent higher than the average rate of dissent in the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits but 2.4 percent
lower than Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger's rate while he sat on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Howard, Litigation Flow in
Three United States Courts of Appeals, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 33, 40 (1973).
The true significance of Justice Stevens' high rate of dissent may lie in the
fact that:
[T] he typical dissenter has been a tenacious advocate of traditional
legal doctrines which were being abandoned during his tenure; consequently he adhered to precedent with far greater regularity than
his non-dissenting colleagues, and his persistent attempts at turning
back the doctrinal tides of his era usually met with failure.
Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. ToRoNTO

L.J. 194, 209 (1962).
15. See Hearings36, 54, 68-69. But see Special Project 190-94.
16. Oelsher, Opinions by Stevens Hint Attitudes of Nominee to Court,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1975, § 1, at 37, col. 1. See Hearings 39.
In this respect Justice Stevens should satisfy Professor Wigmore's lament

that an "acquaintance with legal history is almost totally lacking" among
judges. Wigmore, The Qualities of Current JudicialDecisions, 9 ILL. L. REV.
529, 530 (1915). Justice Stevens rarely misses an opportunity to quote from
T. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND:

FROM THE AccEssIoN OF JAvrs II

(10

vols. 1896). See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1115 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975); Stevens, The Office of an Office,
supra note 4. His historical bent has taken him as far back as Darcy v.

Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602) to discover the original purpose behind "the royal prerogative" of a patent. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 590 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.

1066 (1972).
17. Hearings 36.

Though the general theme of his opinions is one of restraint, our
analysis of Justice Stevens indicates policy preferences enter his decisions in at least two areas: cases involving either gender discrimination or prisoners' rights. Besides presenting Justice Stevens' approach to constitutional decisionmaking and documentary
construction, we will reconcile his policy preferences with his
avowed judicial philosophy.
Resisting the temptation to predict the impact of a new justice
upon current issues of constitutional adjudication, we focus on Justice Stevens' statements concerning a judge's role in the decisionmaking process. This role can be traced through his decisions involving contracts, administrative regulations, statutes, and the Constitution. These documents, ranging from the most personal to the
most public, form a hierarchy of written instruments based on consent. Because Justice Stevens defines himself as a narrow constructionist, his treatment of documents should demonstrate the extent to which he fits his self-defined role and may illuminate his
treatment of the Constitution. In addition, a consideration of his
due process decisions,18 particularly those involving state action,
procedural and substantive fairness, gender discrimination, and
prisoners' rights, provides a representative model for analyzing his
approach to constitutional decisionmaking. These cases are particularly appropriate, for the questions of law they involved were in
flux while Judge Stevens sat on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Because at that time Supreme Court precedent was sparse
or unclear, Judge Stevens had a certain freedom of decision.
DocumENTARY CoNsTRucrIoN
The Constitution is a written document.1 9 Thus it falls, albeit
uniquely, within the class of written instruments which the judiciary must interpret. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the
manner in which Justice Stevens construes other documents: contracts, administrative regulations, and statutes. Because a substantial portion of the Court's business does not involve constitutional
adjudication, reviewing Justice Stevens' non-constitutional decisions is necessary. Moreover, construction of these documents provides a control group 20 with which to contrast Justice Stevens'
18. By due process we mean to include cases in which equal protection
claims were also present. Compare Hampton v. Sun Wong, 44 U.S.L.W,
4737, 4740, 4742 (U.S. June 1, 1976) (Stevens, J.), with id. at 4746 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. But see Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 703 (1975). See also C. BLAcK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP W
CoNsTrNZUOxAL LAW (1969).
20. Admittedly constitutional adjudication significantly differs from more
traditional cases. Nevertheless, it is helpful to juxtapose Justice Stevens'
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process of constitutional decisionmaking. Because construction of
the Constitution often goes beyond an analysis of the words found
in that document, a treatment of these cases may foreshadow Justice Stevens' approach to the Constitution. To the extent the Constitution is treated merely as a super-statute, Justice Stevens' commentaries on these documents are predictive of his future constitutional interpretation.
Contracts

Justice Stevens is averse to leaving the four corners of a contract
in order to derive its meaning.21 When he does consider other
sources, he tends to prefer previous explications by field specialists
such as the National Labor Relations Board or by the parties to the
contract. For example, in InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp.
v. Husky Oil Co.,22 the parties had failed to state whether interest

was payable upon surrender of a leasehold. 23 In dissent, Justice
Stevens took this failure of specification as his cue to find that the
1 2 5 and
plain meaning 24 of surrender "constitute[d] payment in full"
that such an interpretation comported with the underlying transaction. The threshold fact for Justice Stevens was that "[t] here is
no express reference to the payment of interest, in addition to the
conveyance of the property."2 6 In contradistinction to Justice
Stevens' analysis, the majority pointed out:
It is also true that this contingency did not expressly state that interest would not be due and payable as in the case of the acceleration clause, where the words IMC "shall . . . credit Husky's Note
account27in the [principal] amount ... plus interest" were employed.

treatment of the traditional case and the constitutional case, to provide a
complete picture of his approach to problem resolution.
21. See, e.g., Economy Finance Corp. v. United States, 501 F.2d 466, 483
(7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975);

Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 816-17 (7th Cir. 1972).
Special Project 186-88.

22. 485 F.2d 153, 161 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 162.

See also

24. See also Murphy, Old Mai ms Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule"
and Statutory Interpretationin the "Modern" FederalCourts, 75 CoLmv. L.
REv. 1299 (1975).

25. 485 F.2d at 162.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 157.

Having found this hole in the contract, the majority proceeded to
28
fill it with an implied obligation, based upon secondary sources,
to pay interest. Characteristically, Justice Stevens hesitated to find
implicit meaning in the parties' absence of expression and was reluctant to rely on secondary source material.
Administrative Regulations-ProductSafety
Justice Stevens has adopted a broader standard of review 20 for
administrative agencies dealing with products: The product must
be demonstrably detrimental, and the results of its removal must
be not only demonstrably safer but also practicable. Thus Justice
Stevens does not impose a policy decision that competition must
continue despite any consequences. Instead of prohibiting the
product because of its deleterious effects, he demands the agency
consider available practical alternatives. When an agency has
shown its due consideration of0 these standards, Justice Stevens will
3
uphold the agency regulation.
3
Consistently ' Justice Stevens has been reluctant to take a product off the market. In Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. EPA,32 misuse
of phosphorous paste as a rodent deterrent was proven to kill children and even some adults. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens pointed
out:
No details whatever were given as to the comparative effectiveness
of the alternatives in rodent and roach control in the lower socioeconomic
areas or of comparative cost or difficulty of administra33
tion.
His argument was that even if the product is harmful, the agency
failed to weigh the comparative costs of eliminating the product.
28. Id. at 159.
29. E.g.,
Congress deliberately selected a broader standard for review of
food additive tolerance to focus on the fairness of the evaluation
so that the "[p]ersonal attitudes or preferences of administrative
officials could not prevail on the basis of being supported by substantial evidence picked from the record without regard to other
evidence of probative value in the record ......

Continental

Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331, 341 n.37 (7th Cir.
1972).
Compare Hampton v. Sun Wong, 44 U.S.L.W. 4737 (U.S. June 1, 1976
(Stevens, J.), with Mathews v. Diaz, 44 U.S.L.W. 4748 (U.S. June 1, 1976).
See also Comment, Vapor Recovery: Last Gasp of the Clean Air Act?, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 354, 372 (1976); text accompanying note 75 infra.
30. See United States v. Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945 (1975). See also Special Project 182-90.
31. H & H Tire Co. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 471 F.2d 350, 356
(7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., concurring); Continental Chemiste Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972); Stearns Elec. Paste Co. v. EPA,
461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972).
32. 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Special Project 182-83.
33. Id. at 298 n.10.
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Similarly, in H & H Tire Co. v. United States Department of
Transportation,4 Justice Stevens concurred in a result which precluded the imposition of stricter standards on retreaded tires:
Although I recognize that safety is the "overriding consideration
in the issuance of standards" under this Act[35] the statute requires respondent to consider whether a proposed standard is
reasonable, practicable and appropriate" before it is prescribed.
In my opinion this duty has not been discharged until respondent
has at least identified some of the costs associated with the proposal
and determined that
these costs are overridden by reasonably pre36
dictable benefits.
If these administrative standards were acts of Congress, the decisions could easily be characterized as Lochnerizing37 because of
their emphasis on freedom of choice.38 In fact, one commentator
criticized H & H Tire as an example of "the potential pitfalls" of

"judicial activism" when the "complex questions of the needs of
safety" are "second-guessed by the courts."3 9
In sum, with an administrative regulation, as opposed to a contract, Justice Stevens enforces two policy considerations external
to the document: He seeks to encourage competition,"0 and he de-

34. 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972).
35. National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381
et seq. (1970).
36. 471 F.2d at 356-57 (footnotes omitted).
37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Gunther, Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 42 (1972).
38. See H & H Tire Co. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 471 F.2d 350,
356 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. Morgan, Seventh Circuit Review-Administrative Law, 50 CH.-KENT
L. REV. 214, 216 (1973).
40. Cf. Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 56 (1975) (Clayton Act violation); CONOCO v. Witco Chemical
Corp., 484 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1973) (patent infringement); Continental
Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1972) (patent
infringement); Stevens, Symposium-Regulated Industries and Antitrust,
Introductory Remarks, supra note 4, at 244. But cf. Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 44 U.S.L.W. 3592
(U.S. Apr. 20, 1976) (underwriter of short term commercial paper held
liable for failure to investigate the issuer despite reliance on fraudulently
prepared financial statements); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
Douglas, and White, JJ., would have granted certiorari. Powell, J., took
no part in the decision.), overruled, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
427 U.S. 723 (1975). Eason held the rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (plaintiff

sires to ensure the availability of practical alternatives. 4 1
Statutes
Statutory construction 42 is the paradigm 43 of documentary construction. Following a traditional approach to construction prob44
lems, Justice Stevens looks to the basic purpose of the legislation,
then to the legislative intent with respect to the specific act,4" and
finally to the structure of the entire statute. 46 These factors provide the framework through which Justice Stevens approaches the
specific section or phrase in question. For guidance he relies upon
a fairly well-defined hierarchy of counselors: Supreme Court opinions, 47 statements by the bill's major proponents, 48 the historical
context in which the bill was enacted, 4 9 congressional failure to
state a proposition which one would expect to find in the act had
Congress so intended, 50 the alternative construction most consistent
in a rule lOb-5 action [17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1975) ] must be either a purchaser or seller of a security) was no longer applicable. See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
41. For a further elaboration of the external construction theory, see text
accompanying notes 79-80 infra. Accord, Special Project169, 189-90.
42. See generally Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation,38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1965); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Traynor, Statutes
Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATHOLIc U.L. REv. 401 (1968); Comment, Statutory Construction-TheRole of the Court, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 382
(1969).
43. For a further exposition of our use of the terms paradigm, normal
(text accompanying notes 79-80 infra) and exemplar (text accompanying
notes 154-55 infra), see T. KuN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIc REvoLUTIoNs
(2d ed. 1970); Masterman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in CRITICISM AD THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave rev. ed. 1972). E.g., Lines
v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293, 299 (7th Cir.
1975); United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971).
45. See Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1973).
46. See Hodgson v. Lodge 851, AFL-CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 557 (7th Cir. 1971)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Special Project164-82.
47. See, e.g., Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972), overruled, Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States,
409 U.S. 151 (1972); United States v. Merle A. Patnode Co., 457 F.2d 116
(7th Cir. 1972).
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 825 n.35, 826 n.37
(7th Cir. 1972); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Confer. of Teamsters,
454 F.2d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1972). For Justice Stevens' use of committee
reports compare Kelly v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 307, 310, with Brennan
v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 514 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
and Kronenberger v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 18, 19 (7th Cir. 1974).
49. See Blew v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1973).
50. United States v. Zemater, 501 F.2d 540, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam).
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52
with the act's purpose, 5 ' and administrative regulations.

Two examples from the field of labor law aptly evince Justice
Stevens' approach to statutory construction.

Associated General

Contractors v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters83 presented the
question of whether the district court could enjoin a strike to preserve its jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. Justice Stevens
relied on three critical factors in holding that the district court did
not have the power
to enjoin the strike. First, the dispute was
54
"squarely covered"

by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,55 whose purpose

was to curtail the judiciary's "participation in determining the merits of the issues arising between unions and employers."5 6 Second,
Justice Stevens relied on the Supreme Court's construction of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770:57

[TJhe Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the granting of injunctive

relief in ...the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract
contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration proce-

dure..
Therefore, the third and determinative factor for Justice Stevens
was that "[t] he union had not agreed to compulsory arbitration.
On the contrary, it had expressly reserved the right to 'economic
recourse' in the event of a deadlock."58
In other words, in terms of the original model, Justice Stevens
derived the basic purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act from its historical context and the Supreme Court opinion in Boys Markets. In
applying this purpose, Justice Stevens found, as required by Boys
Markets, that the contractual language was controlling. 59
51. See, e.g., Brennan v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 514 F.2d 1082, 1084
(7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); McTaggart v. Secretary of the Air Force, 458
F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (7th Cir. 1972).
52. Blew v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1973).
53. 454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1972).
54. Id. at 1328.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
56. Id.
57. 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970). See generally Axelrod, The Application of
the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C. INw. & Com. L.
REV. 893 (1975); Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The
Boys Markets Case, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 215 (P. Kurland ed.

1970).
58. 454 F.2d at 1329.

59. See also text accompanying notes 21-28 supra; Special Project 175-

77.

Hodgson v. Lodge 851, AFL-CIO06 is a fascinating case because
Justice Stevens opens his dissent by stating that "[tflhis case involves a narrow issue of statutory construction"6 1 and concludes
eleven pages later by saying that:
[I]f in the day-to-day business of government the Executive is permitted to substitute his ideas of expedience for policy determinations unambiguously expressed by Congress, larger issues will routinely be
decided without regard to our basic constitutional
scheme. 62
The Secretary of Labor must institute suit within sixty days " in
order to require a new union election based on union violations of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.0 4 The issue
in Hodgson was whether the Secretary was justified under the Act
in relying upon the union's waiver of this time limitation. Narrowly construing the statute, Justice Stevens would have required
the Secretary to file within sixty days. Irrespective of the substantive outcome, 65 his analysis of the statute is a model to emulate.
His method is only summarized here.
First, Justice Stevens noted that the alternative remedies within
the structure of the Act 66 were in the union member's control.
Therefore, he concluded that with respect to the particular section
in question (where the Secretary retained "unique"6 7 control over
the available remedy) "the repeated use of mandatory language"0 6
must be given full effect. Next, Justice Stevens buttressed his
analysis by examining the section's60 purpose and its legislative history.70 He copiously detailed the "changes in form" of the section
60. 454 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1971). See generally Hopson, Judicial Review

of the Secretary of Labor's Decision Not to Sue to Set Aside a Union Election
under Title IV of the LMRDA, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1281 (1972); Rauh,
LMRDA-Enforce it or Repeal it, 5 GA.L. REv. 643 (1971) (details the De-

partment of Labor's inaction while Messrs. Boyle and Yablonski fought for
control of the UMW).
61. 454 F.2d at 554.
62. Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).

64. Id. § 401 et seq. The waiver would usually be executed by the union
officials whose conduct was under attack.

65. Obviously, the majority decided contra to Justice Stevens and so did
Hodgson v. International Printing Pressmen, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971).
66. 454 F.2d at 555-56 (7th Cir. 1971).
67. Id. at 556.
68. Id. at 557, 563-64.

69. Id. at 557 ("to ensure prompt vindication of a meritorious claim for
the benefit of the dissident members as well as the general public"). Justice Stevens argued that the Act should not be interpreted merely as a statute of limitations.
70. Id. at 557-61.
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and the "comments of interested" legislators. 7 1 Finally, Justice
Stevens rebutted the arguments put forth by the Secretary. 72 Specifically, he concluded that the estoppel theory was inappropriate
because "it permits the Secretary to disguise his general practice
in the clothing of an exceptional case." 73 Congressional acquiescence in a course of administrative conduct did not constitute a ratification of the procedure. 74 The Secretary's policy of negotiation
should not mitigate the congressional command to file suit within
75
sixty days.
As discussed above, Justice Stevens encountered a similar problem in InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp. v. Husky Oil Co.,'
a case concerning contractual interpretation. Under the 1958 draft
the Secretary would have been required to respond within sixty
days, but the statute as finally enacted left this requirement unclear.77 The Hodgson majority filled this hole with policy considerations enunciated by commentators.78 In contrast, Justice Stevens
argued that the "language change" from the draft to the statute
was a mere convenience of expression, not a shift of policy.7 9

71. Id. at 557.
72. Id. at 561-64.
73. Id. at 561.
74. Congress does not sit as a singleminded watchdog ready to bark
out a clarifying amendment at every departure from its command.
It is more like a slumbering army; when aroused it has power to
march where it will. One who desires to direct its attention to a
specific problem must not only have a strong reason to do so, but
also must be willing to risk the consequences of unanticipated action. An interpretation of a provision in the controversial and integrated statute which finally emerged from the legislative process
in 1959 cannot fairly be predicated on unexplained inaction by different Congresses in subsequent years. Id. at 562.
See also Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 13 (1974).
75. Compare Justice Stevens' belief that "[tJhe lessons of history teach
us that the dedication of the eager new administrator may eventually be
replaced by the malaise of the bureaucrat who acts no faster and no more
often than is absolutely necessary," 454 F.2d at 564 (footnote omitted), with
the high standard of review he applies to administrative regulations, text
accompanying notes 29-41 supra.
76. 485 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
77. Hodgson v. Lodge 851, AFL-CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1971).
78. Id. at 552, citing Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry into Title
IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 336, 365, 375 (1968).
79. 454 F.2d at 559.

In terms of the original model, Justice Stevens examined the
structure of the entire statute and then reviewed legislative intent
with respect to the particular section in order to derive its meaning.
He drew support for his interpretation from the major proponents
of the act and from the historical context in which it was passed.
His conclusion was influenced, as with his reading of contracts, by
his overall reluctance to infer meaning from absence.
The previous examples of normal statutory construction may be
characterized as internal issues of interpretation: The debate on the
court concerns what Congress intended by the words Congress
spoke. In contrast, external problems of construction begin with
one of two alternative premises: either the court has no idea what
Congress intended and thus must establish its own policy; or the
court knows exactly what Congress intended but must decide for
itself the appropriate reach of congressional intent, e.g., the scope
80
of a statute based on the commerce clause.
An example of external construction based upon a congressional
failure to speak is United States v. McGarr.8 1 The question was
whether the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Acts2 repealed the parole ineligibility provisions of the Narcotic

Drug Import and Export Act.8 3 Justice Stevens argued that although the penalty provisions of the Narcotic Drug Act remained,
the repeal of the parole ineligibility section would merely remove
"a procedural bar to the application of the independently existing
provisions for suspended sentence, probation and parole which ap'8 4
ply to most offenses.
This opinion reflects a policy decision by Justice Stevens which is
external to the statute. Because he is hesitant to expand federal
criminal jurisdiction, 5 he applies a Rewis-Bass8 0 leniency rule to
80. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
81. 461 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), overruled, Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974). Justice Stevens argued that although he would

prefer to follow congressional policy, he could not "attribute to Congress

the intent to reach [an] absurd result .. . ." 461 F.2d at 4. Only Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall, followed Justice Stevens' line of analysis. 417 U.S. at 667, 669. See generally
Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605 (1973); Gates v. United States, 515
F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970).
83. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, § 501, 80 Stat. 1449. The Act
itself has also been repealed. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act (July
18, 1956) ch. 629, § 105, 70 Stat. 570, repealed,21 U.S.C. 174 (1970).
84. 461 F.2d at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
85. Hearings29, supra note 4.
86. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Rewis v. United States,

401 U.S. 808 (1971).
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statutory construction.

In other words, absent a clear statement

of congressional intent, he will not presume Congress intended to
expand the reach of federal criminal jurisdiction8 7 and thereby alter
the relationship between federal and state prosecution. 8
Although the precise point was not present in McGarr, Justice
Stevens echoed a similar theme: "[W] hen Congress does expressly
repeal a statute, we should not read a savings clause so broadly that
it encompasses much more than is necessary to achieve its general
purpose .
".8..",9
Statutes with a ConstitutionalPredicate
External construction is also necessary when Congress passes a
statute specifically based on the text of the Constitution. Though
congressional intent may be clear, a judge must nevertheless independently ascertain the proper meaning of the constitutional clause
in question. 0 We will examine two examples of this form of external construction.
In United States v. Staszcuk,91 the question was how far the federal statute prohibiting interstate robbery or extortion" should extend into the traditionally local regulation of criminal activity. Be87. Even if preemption does not occur and mutual jurisdiction is retained,
the significance of the state's jurisdiction is decreased when another crime
also becomes a federal offense. See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause
Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 271
(1973).
88. United States v. Walker, 489 F.2d 1353, 1355 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 982 (1974). See also Barrett v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 498,
504 (1976).
89. 461 F.2d at 4.
90. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). But cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970).
91. 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 65 (1975)
(Stevens, J., wrote the majority opinion joined by Fairchild, C.J., Cummings, Tone, and Bauer, JJ.; Sprecher, J., dissented on the basis of his panel
opinion. 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974). Swygert, J., concurred with Judge
Sprecher's dissent and also dissented on a voir dire issue. Pell, J., also filed
a dissenting opinion.). See Recent Case, Constitutional Law-interstate
commerce-extortion-federalcriminal jurisdiction under Hobbs Act satisfied by showing potential effect on commerce, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1348 (1975).
See also Special Project 194.
92. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970).

cause the jurisdictional reach of the statute was co-extensive with
that of the commerce clause, 9 Justice Stevens had to determine the
appropriate boundaries of the clause before interpreting the Act.
In doing so, he looked to the policy behind the commerce clause.
The primary purpose of the Commerce Clause was to secure freedom of trade, to break down the barriers to its free flow, and to
curtail the rising volume of restraints upon commerce that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate to control. A statute which
has a purpose which so unambiguously parallels the fundamental
purpose of its constitutional predicate must receive an expansive
construction. 94

Justice Stevens has also used the technique of external construction to arrive at a less expansive result. For example, in Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 5 detention personnel refused to return a prisoner's diamond ring. The question was whether the plaintiff could
state a federal claim for conversion under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act.96 Because section 1983 provides a civil remedy for violations of the fourteenth amendment0 7 due process clause, Justice
Stevens again had to construe the Constitution in order to interpret
a statute. Initially he presented a narrow textual analysis of the
due process clause by pointing out that the words of the clause establish a tripartite standard: (1) property, life, or liberty must be
involved; (2) state action is required; and (3) the deprivation must
be without due process of law.9 8 Although retention of the prisoner's ring was sufficient state infringement to raise the issue, Justice Stevens held the possibility of recovery via a state-based tort
action precluded the conclusion that the ring was retained without
due process of law. 9 The critical factor for Justice Stevens was
93. "[C]ommerce means . . .all . .. commerce over which the United
States has jurisdiction." Id. § 1951 (b) (3).
94. 517 F.2d at 58. Although Justice Stevens usually relies upon precedent, here he based his entire argument upon Justice Rutledge's analysis
of the commerce clause in W. RuTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAnr 2526 (1947), demonstrating again the significant impact Justice Rutledge had
upon Justice Stevens' approach to the law. See notes 4, 11, 13 supra.
95. 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975), reh'g granted,id.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
97. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
99. Id. at 1066. Justice Stevens often turns to state-based tort actions
as alternative remedies. See text accompanying notes 119-30 infra. It is
interesting to note, however, that he is equally willing to cite then Chief
Judge Cardozo's majority opinion or Judge Andrew's dissent in Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928). Compare
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 657 n.9 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Burger, C.J., Douglas and White,
J.J., would have granted certiorari. Powell, J., took no part in the decision.),
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not the text of the act but rather the external policy rationale of
avoiding overcrowded dockets by refusing to hear such de minimis
claims in federal courts. 0 0
Thus in Staszcuk, Justice Stevens, looking to the policy behind
the commerce clause, read the words with a greater scope that resulted in an expansive reading of the text.'01 In Kimbrough, he invoked policy considerations external to the purpose of either section
1983 or its constitutional predicate and concluded that a narrow
reading of the text was appropriate.
In sum, Justice Stevens is usually faithful to his credo of narrow
construction. Nevertheless, four policy preferences seem to influence his decisions: Administrative regulations must reflect a consideration of practical alternatives; federal criminal jurisdiction
should not be expanded; free trade among the several states should
be protected; and the federal courts should be hesitant to expand
their jurisdiction over de minimis constitutional issues.' 0 2
CoNsTITuTIoNAL ADJUDICATION

Justice Stevens tends to avoid decisions which take an expansive
view of constitutional rights. This inclination is particularly evident in his due process decisions under either the fourteenth
amendment or the Civil Rights Act.' 0 3 Before he will grant relief,
a petitioner must overcome three obstacles inherent in the Justice's
model: First, state action is necessary for the due process clause to
become operative. Justice Stevens' reasoning makes it difficult to
overcome this initial requirement when a private party, acting with
overruled, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 427 U.S. 723 (1975),

with Kiess v. Eason, 442 F.2d 712, 722, 722 n.16 (1971).
100. See 523 F.2d at 1066.
101. Justice Stevens did express concern about the expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 55 (7th Cir.
1975). Accord, Special Project 171.

102. The reader may have noticed an apparent contradiction in the text.
On the one hand, Justice Stevens seeks to limit the reach of federal criminal
jurisdiction (see text accompanying notes 85-89 supra); and on the other
hand, he has expanded federal criminal jurisdiction to provide greater protection for commerce (see text accompanying notes 91-94 supra).

While

the dichotomy is real, we believe this merely represents Justice Stevens'
hierarchy of values. In other words, although it is important to limit federal criminal jurisdiction, it is more important to protect free trade.
103. 42U.S.C. § 1981 etseq. (1970).

the state's aid, is guilty of the criticized conduct. 10 4 Second, if state
action is conspicuous, Justice Stevens struggles to show that any
alternative remedies available to the aggrieved party satisfy the
1
procedural fairness requirement of the fourteenth amendment. 0
Finally, even if no other remedies are available, the petitioner, in
order to recover, must demonstrate that a deprivation of a fourteenth amendment property right'0 6 has occurred.
104. The Supreme Court has slowly expanded the concept of state action
to include situations in which either the state and a private party were acting in concert or the private party was acting with the aid of the state.
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private
restaurant in a publicly owned building refused to serve a Black patron).
Under Chief Justice Burger, however, the Supreme Court appears to have
halted this trend. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) (electric company terminated service to customer without notice or
hearing); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private club
discriminated even though it had obtained one of a limited number of state
liquor licenses).
105. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Stevens, J., concurring), rehg granted, id. at 1057; Horvath v. Chicago,
510 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975); Christman v. Hanrahan, 500 F.2d 65 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939
(7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power
Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
106. In order to come within the purview of the fourteenth amendment,
an action must deprive someone of "life, liberty, or property." Clearly,
property rights do not have to be in tangible objects. A person may have

a "property" right in his or her good name or reputation. The question
is which property rights should be protected. Although the fourteenth
amendment also protects "life" and "liberty," the most serious claims raised
in Justice Stevens' due process opinions relate to the protection of "property" or "interests in property."
In Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), and Shirck
v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), Judge Fairchild decided that the
"career interests" of recently terminated untenured public teachers should
be protected. He held that the teacher in each case should have been given
a statement of reasons for dismissal and the opportunity to be heard. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld a similar requirement when it was
alleged that the termination was due to the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). The Court,
however, has decided that the range of interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was not unlimited. Thus, in reversing Judge Fairchild in both Roth and Shirck (and upholding Judge
Stevens' dissent in Shirck), the Court held that failure to rehire a publicly
employed teacher does not violate an interest in liberty or property protected by procedural due process unless there was a suggestion that the nonretained teacher engaged in some impropriety. Board of Regents v. Roth,
403 U.S. 564, 570-75 (1972); Shirck v. Thomas, 408 U.S. 940 (1972). See
Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does the Nontenured Teacher Have a Constitutional Right to a Hearing Before Nonrenewal?, 61 ILL. B.J. 464 (1973);
Schulman, Employment of Nontenured Faculty: Some Implications of Roth
and Sindermann, 51 DENvER L.J. 215 (1974); Comment, Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth: Procedural Due Process and the Rights of Nontenured Teachers, 3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 179 (1973). See also
Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1974).
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State Action
When private action involves some form of government intrusion, constitutional constraints may apply. Typically, government
action may be involved if a private individual or institution receives
aid, authority, or judicial enforcement of private rights.10 7 For Justice Stevens, the key to a state action analysis is to ascertain that
level of government involvement sufficient to engage the protections of the fourteenth amendment. 0 8
Dismissal of an untenured professor from a private university, 10 9
refusal of a private hospital to allow use of its facilities for abortions, 110 and refusal of a public utility to grant a pretermination
hearing"' are cases in which Justice Stevens has been disinclined
to apply fourteenth amendment constraints to the actions of private parties. Both the university and the hospital were regulated
by and received substantial aid from the state." 2 Moreover, if the
federal and state funds had not been allocated to the hospital, they
could have been used to construct public facilities which could not
discriminate against women seeking abortions."1 Nevertheless, according to Justice Stevens, the level of governmental involvement
was not sufficient to constitute state action. First, the petitioners
107. See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictionsto Private Activity, 74 COLum. L. REV. 656 (1974); Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974).

108. This is not to imply that Justice Stevens' views are unique. Rather,

they represent the prevailing view today. While speaking of all the connections between the state and the private discriminating restaurant, Justice

Clark stated:

Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of
the [State], the benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a
public building devoted to a public parking service, indicates that
degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it was the design of the fourteenth amendment to condemn. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 724
(1961).
See also Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1975).
109. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976).
110. Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
111. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
112. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d
756, 761 (7th Cir. 1973).
113. Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 1973).

failed to show' 14 that the amount of money received transformed
these institutions into public entities for constitutional purposes. 11
Second, the petitioners failed to show that the public funds furthered the specific policies under attack." 6 Coinciding with the
views of other circuits," 7 his analysis emphasized that private institutions, although in part publicly funded, may exercise the same
right to discriminate which they would have absent any state in8
volvement."
Remedial Alternatives
The alleged denial of due process by a public utility raises a more
perplexing problem. In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.," 9
Justice Stevens concluded that the utility, though a state regulated
monopoly, 20 was not acting under color of state law. Because of
the role of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, he had obvious difficulty deciding the state was not involved.' 21 Assuming
a state's failure to act may in certain situations violate due process,' 22 the determining factor is whether the aggrieved party has
114. In Cohen, Justice Stevens both upheld the dismissal of the aggrieved
,professor's complaint and denied her further discovery procedures. In effect, Justice Stevens held that there was no possible way she could prove
her claim. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 825 n.18, 827 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976).
115. Id. at 825.
116. Id. at 825-26; Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 761 (7th
Cir. 1973).
117. See, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969);
Grossner v. Trustees of Colum. Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). It is not clear how a general grant to an institution does not specifically support every activity of that institution. See Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
118. An undercurrent in Justice Stevens' opinion in Doe was that Ms. Doe
had the burden of finding a hospital which would allow their facilities to
be used for abortions. Similarly, in Cohen, he expressed regret that the
antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 20OO0e-2 (1970), were modified too late to help Ms. Cohen. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 255, with
42 U.S.C. § 200e-1 (Supp. II, 1972). Justice Stevens appears to be satisfied
that should Ms. Cohen be discriminated against in the future, she will have
a remedy. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 1975).
See also Special Project 136-39.
119. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). See
also Special Project188-89.
120. Since Lucas the Supreme Court has gone further in limiting the procedural safeguards against improper termination of service by a utility company. For Justice Stevens, a critical point was that the power company
gave the plaintiff five days notice before termination. Id. at 653. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), found that notice of termination was unnecessary.
121. 466 F.2d at 646.
122. For example, the state may have an affirmative duty to protect
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other adequate remedies. 123 For Justice Stevens, the fact that
plaintiff had several informal 124 and formal 125 remedies against the
power company indicated procedural safeguards were adequate. 12
The "adequate alternative remedy" theory also appears in cases involving the invalidation of a high school dress code 127 and the refusal to rule on the vagueness of a state law. 128 In both situations
the plaintiff had the option of following an established procedure
rather than seeking a ruling of unconstitutionality. 12 9 Justice
Stevens' policy finally provoked a sharp connent from a colleague.
"fundamental" rights. Cf. Public Util. Comm. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 46364 (1952).
123. 466 F.2d at 648.
124. The record in Lucas shows that most disputes were settled by a company representative or through the offices of the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission. Id.
125. Justice Stevens maintains that the plaintiff has three formal remedies. He may seek emergency relief in the state courts, pay the disputed
amount and sue for a refund, or sue in tort for any actual damages caused
by a wrongful termination by the power company. Id. at 648-49. Forcing
the customer to initiate these expensive remedies does not take into account
the relative economic and psychological inequalities of the two sides.
126. See generally Note, FourteenthAmendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Service For Nonpayment, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1477 (1973);
Note, ConstitutionalSafeguards for Public Utility Customers: Power to the
People, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (1973); Comment, Light a Candle and Call
an Attorney-the Utility Shutoff Cases, 58 IND.L. REv. 1161 (1973).
127. In Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972), the court invalidated the dress code on constitutional grounds. Justice Stevens dissented
because the plaintiff had the alternative of exempting himself from the
dress code by bringing his parents to school to verify their approval of his
long hair. Id. at 945.
128. In Horvath v. Chicago, 510 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff
complained that a state statute was unconstitutionally vague. Justice Stevens used a novel argument based on the fact that the plaintiff was also
pursuing state remedies. He held that federal involvement was unjustified
because: (1) if the state court finds for the plaintiff, he has an adequate
state remedy; and (2) if the state court finds against the plaintiff, the
statute is no longer vague as to him.
129. This specie of argument demonstrates again Justice Frankfurter's
ideological relationship to Justice Stevens. Compare:
[F]rankfurter, while scorning the sledge-hammer word "unconstitutional," has, more than any other Justice, used the stiletto of statutory interpretation to cut effective regulation to a minimum, often
below what Congress clearly intended; the supplementary device
of using narrow interpretation explicitly to avoid a constitutional
issue is also a Frankfurter favorite; in either case, the result is the
same .... Rodell, supra note 1, at 705,

with text accompanying note 17 supra. See note 13 supra.

In my opinion, the claim of vagueness of a statutory provision is
a proper question for a federal court to decide in a civil case given
the fact that the plaintiff has standing (using that term broadly)
to assert the challenge with respect to his own conduct. If one in
attempting to protect a property interest from state interference can
arguably assert that his conduct is not included within the prohibitory terms of a vague statute, he ought not have to await the
finality of a state proceeding against him before asserting his constitutional right to procedural due process. To require him to do
so is an impermissible form of abstention. Indeed, as I read the
a theme of
last paragraphs of Judge Stevens' opinion, I 1discern
30
abstention which I, for myself, wish to disavow.
FourteenthAmendment Property
1
In an opinion uncharacteristically brief and biting, 8 Justice
Stevens expressed concern that an expansive reading of the due
process clause would create excessive power in the federal judiciary.'3 2 To him the problem is that the due process clause cannot
both define the substantive right to be protected and prescribe the
necessary procedural safeguards. Justice Stevens' rejection of substantive due process rights can best be explained in his own words.

Some years ago courageous and wise federal judges foresaw the
potential harm that might flow from arbitrary actions by state government. On the assumption that the due process clause was more
than a guarantee of fair procedure, they found a basis for substituting their views of sound policy for the "arbitrary" decisions of
state officials. Whether or not their policy judgments were correct,
of the due process clause was fundatheir expansive interpretation
mentally erroneous. 133
Justice Stevens believes it is the function of the states, not the federal judiciary, to provide relief from arbitrary governmental ac34
ion.'
130. 510 F.2d at 597 (Swygert, J., concurring).
131. Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1971).
132. 447 F.2d at 1028. See also Bishop v. Wood, No. 74-1303 (U.S. June
10, 1976), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1, cols. 5-6, & 8 at 21, col. 6.
133. Id. at 1028-29.
134. In our opinion, the questions whether a nontenured teacher,
whose contract is not renewed, has any right to a statement of reasons or to judicial review of the adequacy or accuracy of such a
statement are matters of state law, not federal constitutional law.
There are sound policy reasons to support either a statutory requirement, or an administrative practice, that a complete and accurate written statement of the reasons for such an important decision
be promptly delivered to the teacher. But since, by hypothesis, no
constitutionally protected property or liberty interest of the teacher
is impaired by the Board's action, she has no federally protected
right to a fair hearing or to a fair statement of reasons. The fact
that a state, or a School Board, may voluntarily communicate more
information to her, or receive more information from her, than the
Constitution requires, is not in itself sufficient to create a federal
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For Justice Stevens a dismissal of a claim based on violation of
due process is not actually a ruling on the merits. Although he
often acknowledges existence of the injustice he is unwilling to read
the Constitution so broadly as to grant a federal claim for relief.

Thus, if the property or interest in property sought to be protected
is not guaranteed by another clause of the Constitution, he believes
that no federally enforceable claim should exist.'1 35
Gender Discrimination: An Exception
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964136 explicitly gives jurisdiction to the federal court to decide cases based on gender discrimination. 137 Thus the policy decisions reflected in Justice Stevens' gender discrimination opinions cannot be cloaked in the previously mentioned shroud of judicial abstention. In Sprogis v. United
Air Lines,1 8 an airline stewardess was discharged for violating
right that does not otherwise exist. Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974).
But see Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975) (fifth amendment due
process). In Eskra Justice Stevens invalidated a Wisconsin statute (illegitimate children cannot inherit through their mother's estate) when the distributor is the United States. Id.
Compare Hampton v. Sun Wong, 44
U.S.L.W. 4737, 4741 (U.S. June 1, 1976) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment ... has a substantive as well as a procedural aspect."),
with id. at 4740 n.17. See also Special Project 131-34.
135. Here Justice Stevens' views appear to parallel Mr. Justice Black's
concern that flexible standards of constitutional adjudication lead to unpredictable results. See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,
76 HARv. L. REV. 673, 717 (1963).
There would be a federal claim, however, if the protested action interfered with a constitutionally protected right. Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974).
For it is familiar doctrine that a State cannot discriminate among
its citizens on the basis of their race or, for example, their exercise
of rights protected by the First Amendment....
[T]he standards
for implementing the concept of substantive due process are found
elsewhere in the Constitution, and not merely in the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th
Cir. 1975), reh'g granted,id. at 1057.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
137. It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ...
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
See generally Johnston, Sex Discriminationand the Supreme Court, 1975,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 235 (1975); Lombard, Sex: A Classificationin Search of
Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1355 (1975); Special Project 174-75.
138. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).

United's no-marriage rule. The majority held that because male
stewards' 3 9 were under no such restraint, United was discriminating against its stewardesses on the basis of their sex. 140 In dissent
Justice Stevens argued that a literal reading of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 would result in the conclusion that men are discriminated
against because they are ineligible for those jobs held by stewardesses.' 4 ' He describes such a result as anomalous. A reductio
ad absurdum analysis of Justice Stevens' position leads to the conclusion that discrimination against one sex is permissible so long
42
as discrimination of a different kind exists against the other.
Two years later Justice Stevens again dissented. In Rose v.
BridgeportBrass Co.,' 43 the majority reversed a summary judgment
against a woman employee who alleged gender discrimination as
144
evidenced by a drastic change in the female-male employee ratio.
Justice Stevens maintained that the summary judgment should be
upheld because the woman had not demonstrated the employer's actions were motivated by an intent to discriminate against female
employees.' 4 5 The Supreme Court, however, has held that such a
139. Apparently, the male "flight cabin attendants" on overseas flights
had essentially the same duties as stewardesses on regular flights. 444 F.2d
at 1199.
140. Id.
141. Justice Stevens' argument was that, except for certain flights, males
were not eligible for the jobs held by stewardesses. Because until 1966 no
male was eligible for the job held by Ms. Sprogis, there were no males
similarly situated who were not discriminated against by the no-marriage
rule. Id. at 1203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1202. The Supreme Court rejected this line of argument when
applied to racial discrimination. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
143. 487 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1973).
144. Id. at 809.
145. Id. at 813 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While voting to uphold a summary judgment against the woman, Justice Stevens stated:
The three factors discussed so far include no evidence that any of
the actions taken by the company were motivated by an intent to
discriminate against the plaintiff or against female employees. Support for the discrimination charge is predicated entirely on the fact
that the operating changes resulted in a change in the relative number of females employed in the department and employed as blanking press operators. Id.
Discriminatory motivation, however, has been held unnecessary. The
courts are in agreement that if the result is discriminatory, there is a triable
issue as to whether the practice has

".

. . a manifest relationship to the em-

ployment in question." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
See Harper v. T.W.A., 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Washington,
512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976)
(Stevens, J., concurred separately, id. at 4800, "the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright .... );
Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975); NAACP
v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
Bridgeport Guardians v. Members of Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973);
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demonstration is unnecessary in the application of Title VII to racial discrimination. 146 Justice Stevens seemed to fear a rejection
of the motivational requirement would eventually force the conclusion that a member of the disfavored sex would be entitled to a
147
trial whenever a one-to-one employment ratio is absent.
A possible reason for Justice Stevens' position may be found in
his statements during his confirmation hearings. At one point he
explained that he would apply the same standards in cases involving the rights of women as in those involving the rights of Blacks. 148
The next day, however, he acknowledged he might apply a different
standard of review in gender discrimination cases. 149 When pressed
by Senator Kennedy, Justice Stevens stated that he was more concerned about racial discrimination than about gender discrimination.1 0 In other words, as with contracts and statutes, Justice
Stevens returns to the primacy of the text. Whereas there is a textual reference to racial equality, sexual equality is yet to be accorded that level of constitutional dignity.' 5 ' Thus Justice Stevens'
less stringent standard of review as applied to gender discrimination is another manifestaion of this narrow approach to documentary construction.
Prisoners'Rights
Prisoners' rights has been an expanding field since 1968.152

Jus-

United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
146. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
147. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 814 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting). What is so odd about Justice Stevens' treatment of
Griggs is that he is usually scrupulous about following the dictates of the

Supreme Court. He is always careful to distinguish the views of individual

justices to avoid citing an opinion as controlling if a majority has not
formed around the particular issue. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 505
F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir.
1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also Comment, The Law of LibelConstitutional Privilege and The Private Individual: Round Two, 12 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 455 (1975).

148. Hearings34, supra note 4.
149. Id. at 57.
150. Id. at 16.
151. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XMI, XIV, XV.
This is not to suggest that racial and sexual equality are substitutable
as X and Y in an algebraic formula of equal protection. See Keynote address by Professor Ginsburg, "Realizing the Equality Principle" (6th National Conference on Women and the Law), as cited in, G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERiALS ON CoNsTiTuToNAL LAw 771 n.2 (9th ed. 1975).
152. The leading case is Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). See Wolf

tice Stevens is proud of his contributions 5 3 and has demonstrated
a marked sensitivity to the tragedy of the United States correctional
system. 154 We do not portend to review the entire field; rather we
will use this area as an exemplar of how Justice Stevens implements a policy decision.
For Justice Stevens the tension between the constitutional rights
of prisoners, the need for prison security, and the discretion which
must be allowed prison officials is an intense reality. Justice
Stevens' twenty-eight 55 opinions relating to prisoners' rights demv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Wilwording v. Svenson, 404 U.S.
249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378
U.S. 546 (1964). See generally Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Statistical Survey in the Northern District of
Illinois, 6 LoYoLA-CHI. U.L.J. 527 (1975); Note, The Fourteenth Amendment
and Prisons: A New Look at Due Process for Prisoners,26 HAsTINs L.J.

1277 (1975); Comment, Due Process at In-Prison Disciplinary Proceedings,
50 Cui.-KENT L. Ruv. 498 (1973); Comment, Due Process Clause held applicable to the revocation of statutory good time credits and punitive segregation in interprisonadministrativeactions, 7 IND. L. Rnv. 601 (1974); Comment, New Barrierto Federal Court Review: The Habeas Corpus Exhaustion Requirement as Applied to Prisoners' Conditions of Confinement, 9
N w ENGLAND L. REv. 615 (1974); Comment, A Giant Step Backwards: The
Supreme Court Speaks Out on Prisoners'First Amendment Rights, 70 Nw.
U.L. REv. 352 (1975).
153. See Hearings 15, 73. Justice Rutledge was also concerned about the
plight of prisoners. See Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, supra note 4, at 32734. See also United States v. MacCollom, No. 74-1487 (U.S. June 10, 1976)
(Stevens, J. dissenting), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1, cols. 5-6, &
8, at 21, col. 6.
154. Justice Stevens quoted the following passage with approval:
It is, for the most part, a policy of isolation and punishment accompanied by the rhetoric of rehabilitation, which results in the chronic
underfinancing, inadequate staffing, deflected sexuality, and general lack of resources and poverty of imagination that characterizes
our prisons and jails. H. Mattick, The Prosaic Sources of Prison
Violence 2, cited in Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1349 n.15
(7th Cir. 1973), reh'g, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974). But cf. Special
Project 159-60.
155. Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens,
J., concurring), rel'g granted, id. at 1057; Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975) (Douglas, J., would have granted
certiorari); Chapman v. Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); Mueller v. Turcott, 501 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1974) (participated);
United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 166, 173 (7th Cir. 1974) (en bane)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Peters v. Gray, 494 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam); Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1974) (participated); Haines v. Kerner, 492 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), rel'g, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Knell v. Bensinger, 489
F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Shead v. Quatsoe, 486 F.2d 694 (7th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973);
United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973); Ganz
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onstrate that although he is uncertain about the appropriate relief,
he believes some action should be taken. He has adopted a goslow' 56 attitude while seeking the advice of prison officials. 157 The
best way to comprehend his position is to examine a hypothetical
prisoner and then to demonstrate how Justice Stevens has circumscribed the implementation of his policy preference.,
Before the prisoner arrives in federal court, available state remedies must be exhausted. 158 Once in court, pro se litigants will receive deferential treatment,159 but if an attorney is appointed, the
attorney's opinion will be given great weight.16 0 If Justice Stevens
reaches the merits, he will limit himself to the individual case in
granting relief or will establish minimum procedural safeguards. 161
v. Bensinger, 480 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1973); United States ez Tel. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973); United
States ex Tel. Montgomery v. Illinois, 473 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam); Wimberly v. Laird, 472 F.2d 923 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
921 (1973); United States ex tel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d (7th Cir.
1973); United States ex tel. Kendzierski v. Brantley, 447 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1971); Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 925 (1972); Davis v. United States, 446 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); United States v. McGarthy, 445 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1971); Harris
v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Reid, 437 F.2d 1166
(7th Cir. 1971). Unless otherwise indicated, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in each of the above decisions.
156. United States ex tel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719 n.37 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973).
157. Id. at 718.
158. See Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975). Justice
Stevens' equivocation on this point is characterized by the following statement:
This is not to suggest that the plaintiff in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action must exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal relief.
Rather, it seems to us that the availability of an adequate state
remedy for a simple property damage claim avoids any constitutional violation. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.
1975).
In concurrence, Chief Judge Fairchild thought that "[t]he availability of a
state remedy in damages [was] irrelevant .

. . ."

Id. at 1321.

159. Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 1972). But cf. Kenner
v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 19, 24 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(taxation).
160. Justice Stevens is concerned that if attorneys for indigent defendants
are overburdened, the bar will fail to provide enough lawyers to represent
indigents. See Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804-05 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States ex tel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1973); Nickols
v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972). Accord, Special Project 181 n.296. But cf. Comulada v. Pickett,
455 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
161. See text accompanying note 17 supra. The statement is not pre-

Limited relief is critical in understanding Justice Stevens. He is
uncomfortable granting prospective relief from future injury on the
basis of broad, ill-defined policies. For example, in Morales v.
Schmidt,0 2 the court rejected a prisoners' first amendment' 08 objection to a partial ban on his letter writing privileges. In dissent,
Justice Stevens stressed the ad hoc nature of the provisions as
ground for reversal:
In my opinion, any action which abridges First Amendment rights
bears a heavier burden of justification if it implements an ad hoc
determination rather than a preformulated standard. Guidelines
which evidence awareness of the conflicting considerations that
should influence particular decisions are presumptively valid.104
Morales is characteristic of Justice Stevens' prisoners' rights decisions requiring the creation of procedural safeguards.
Justice Stevens is comfortable with a procedural due process
analysis. He has embraced the Supreme Court's description of
cisely accurate because when Justice Stevens must confront a broad procedural question, he tends to enunciate minimal safeguards and then allow
case-by-case adjudication to work out the details. See, e.g., Bonner v.
Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex tel. Miller
v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 718-19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146
(1973).
Again, the idea has its origins in the thought of Justice Rutledge:
The majority had adopted a rigid jurisdictional rule-even rejecting the government's offer to waive its objection to jurisdictionpartly because a contrary rule, if applied mechanically, would have
unfortunate consequences. In Rutledge's view, both extreme positions could be avoided by placing greater reliance on the judgment
of judges. Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, supra note 4, at 329.
See notes 11, 13 supra.

This type of solution, narrow right accompanied by case law development, is characteristic of Justice Stevens' approach to problems. See Eason
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 670 n.29 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Burger, C.J., Douglas & White, J.J.,
would have granted certiorari. Powell, J. took no part in the decision.),
overruled, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 427 U.S. 723 (1975).
Although this type of decision provides the litigants with an adequate solution, it would provide inadequate guidance to the lower courts if Justice
Stevens continues this policy on the Supreme Court. See Gunther, In
Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice
Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1026 (1972). See also Liles v. Oregon, 44
U.S.L.W. 3623 (U.S. May 4, 1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of

certiorari).
162. 489 F.2d 1335, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rational
relationship standard applied to prisoner's correspondence), reh'g en banc,

494 F.2d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring) (reasonably and

necessarily related to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment standard), rev'g, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wisc. 1972) (compel-

ling state interest standard).
163. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See also Special Project 141-44.
164. 489 F.2d at 1348 (footnote omitted).
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"fundamental fairness" as the "touchstone of due process."'165 In
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,' 1 6 he required that "until
the rule-making process has been given an opportunity to develop
more fully" the intraprison disciplinary action must meet the "bare
minimum" of procedural due process. 167 Although this opinion was
criticized by the dissent for its "cautious" attitude, 6 8 it is typical
of Justice Stevens. Rather than demanding the "full panoply"'1 9 of

constitutional safeguards, Justice Stevens merely required minimum procedures and left the rest to the prison administrators.
Justice Stevens believes the judiciary uniquely qualified to decide
questions of procedural fairness. 7 0 This belief may explain why
165. See Shead v. Quatsoe, 486 F.2d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam),
citing, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
166. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973). See also
Special Project 187.
167. 479 F.2d at 716.
168. Id. at 722-23.
169. Id. at 713.
170. This idea is uniquely important because it is one of the two foci
of Justice Stevens' jurisprudence.
The idea originates with Justice Rutledge. He stated that:
Facts are primarily within the jury's function. Hence it must be
given wide latitude, or trial by jury becomes trial by court. But
the jury is not absolute in the realm of fact. Like judges, jurors
have weaknesses of emotion and judgment. Unlike judges, they
seldom have a background of decision experience against which to
check them. Our tradition supplies this through judicial controls
. Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
Justice Stevens embraced this idea with the observation that:
Significantly, Rutledge identified the judges' "background of decision experience" as the faculty differentiating judges from jurors.
He had great faith in wisdom born of experience and mistrusted
untried statements of general principles. Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, supra note 4, at 330.
But Justice Stevens would not fully develop the idea until Shirck v.
Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), which held the nonretention of a
nontenured teacher required a due process hearing. See text accompanying
notes 131-33 supra. In dissent, Justice Stevens enunciated one of his rationales for limiting the judicial function:
In final analysis the "due process" decision will not turn on any
question of fair procedure but on a judge's evaluation of the substance of the administrative determination. I believe judges are
qualified by experience and trainingto evaluate proceduralfairness
and to interpret and apply guidelines established by others; I do
not believe they have any special competence to make the kind of
policy judgment that this case implicitly authorizes. The assumption that they do invites the reaction that was produced by decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 [1905]. Id. at 1029
(emphasis added).
In other words, what began with Justice Rutledge as a narrow limitation,

he has aggressively sought to protect the procedural rights of prisoners while at the same time he limits the federal class based remedies available to women. When an individual prisoner appears at
the appellate level, Justice Stevens takes two courses of action. He
first establishes minimum procedural safeguards and then limits his
subsequent review to a determination of whether the administrative action is arbitrary. In contrast to this two-tier approach to
prisoners, Justice Stevens must confront the substantive question
of whether discrimination against women is present. Unlike with
intraprison disciplinary actions, the court cannot create procedural
rights under which some agency can adjudicate the particular issues
of a case. Thus, because Justice Stevens cannot limit women's
rights to procedure, as he can with prisoners', he has refused to
171
grant any relief.

CONCLUSION

According to Justice Stevens, 17 2 the use of force in a democracy
must be legitimatized through the consensus formation process of
political rulemaking. Because the judiciary does not derive its
power from the democratic process, it should limit its policy formation role.
Even so, there is one area-procedural fairness-in which the judiciary is especially qualified to play a more aggressive role. A history of decisionmaking experience and legal training inculcates
within the judiciary the traditions of fair play. Justice Stevens demands strict compliance with not only the letter but also the spirit
but cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (Rutledge,
J.), on the primacy of the jury's fact-finding responsibility (U.S. CONST.
amend. VII) has become for Justice Stevens a limitation on the policy formulation role of the judiciary. See also notes 4, 11, 13, 94, 153, 161 supra.
171. With all due respect to the Justice, we hazard a criticism of his technique of narrow construction. In the gender discrimination and prisoners'
rights cases Justice Stevens' technique of constitutional adjudication was
substantially similar; only the context changed. Therefore, we believe
these two lines of cases can be reconciled only by assuming unstated premises which Justice Stevens has not articulated in his decisions. Whatever
those premises are, we believe more forthright, if not more "principled,"
decisions would be rendered if these premises were articulated. See gen-

erally Thayer, JudicialLegislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 HARv. L. Rsv. 172, 189, 197 (1891). Compare
Bishop v. Wood, No. 74-1303 (U.S. June 10, 1976) (5-4) (Stevens, J., writing
for the majority) (no due process termination hearing for public employees), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1, cols. 5-6, & 8, at 21, col. 6,
with United States v. MacCollom, No. 74-1487 (5-4) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(trial transcripts for prisoners), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1,
cols. 5-6, & 8, at 21, col. 6.
172. See notes 13, 17, 74, 75, 129, 133, 134, 164 and accompanying text
supra.
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of procedural safeguards. When these procedural requirements are
satisfied, Justice Stevens believes the judiciary duty bound to follow the substantive result reached by a political institution which
represents a consensual decision.
Justice Stevens' view of a judge's role allows us to unify his somewhat disparate opinions. The consensual intent of the parties,
whether contractual, statutory, or constitutional, is usually controlling. Administrative agencies are subject to a higher standard of
review because they represent a secondary level of consensus formation. Until the consensus formation process has accorded sexual
equality the same constitutional consideration as racial equality, it
will not receive similarly solicitous treatment. 173 Although Justice
Stevens will not review substantive decisions made by prison administrators,174 he does demand that those officials follow procedures calculated to insure minimal standards of fairness.
In sum, Justice Stevens, in the tradition of Mr. Justice Powell,
will probably assume a centrist position on the Court. The present
Court majority "trust[s] institutions and officials.' 17 Therefore
the Court, though reluctant to enunciate "prophylactic rules," is
ready to grant relief in the particular case. 76 Similarly Justice
Stevens stated that the Court cannot be "a roving commission to
reform all the sins of the executive" but rather that it should grant
relief when the "perversion" of an agency function results in indi77
vidual injury.1
Future decisions will determine whether Justice Stevens' views
of a limited judicial role continue.
AFTERWORD

As this Comment goes to press, Justice Stevens' first two Supreme Court dissents lend credence to the themes identified in this
article.
173. As of this writing the Equal Rights Amendment, proposed U.S.

amend. XXVII, fell four short of the required thirty-eight ratifying
state legislatures. G. GuNTHER, supra note 151, at ciii n.t.
174. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 711-21 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973).
175. Symposium, The Burger Court and the Constitution, 11 CoLUm. J.L.
& Soc. PROB. 35, 57 (1974) (Dean Paulsen speaking).
176. Id.
177. Hearings30.
CONST.

In a dissent joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens
thought the existence of an adequate state remedy and the absence
of actual' 78 injury precluded federal intervention. 179 In the second
opinion, this time joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Marshall, Justice Stevens continued to require minimum procedural
safeguards for prisoners. 80
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178. Compare Hearings 15 ("symbolic" value of the Equal Rights Amendment), with note 179 infra.
179. Bucolo v. Adkins, 96 S. Ct. 1086 (1976). The problem in Bucolo was
a complex procedural issue. The Court had previously reversed petitioners'
obscenity convictions in Florida. Bucolo v. Florida, 421 U.S. 927 (1975).
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court sent the case to the trial court for
further proceeding. Bucolo v. State, 316 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1975). Then the
State Attorney General nolle prossed the charges. At this point, the petitioners requested the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Florida Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court granted leave to file a
petition mandamus the Florida Supreme Court but declined to issue the extraordinary writ after explaining Florida's error.
For the Court the determinative factor was
that nothing in the state court record, as it now stands, recognizes
that the State was foreclosed by this Court's decision from seeking
to convict petitioners of obscenity violations. We are unable to dismiss as insignificant petitioner's plaint that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida, as it now stands, obscures this Court's favorable adjudication on the merits-an adjudication which requires
full recognition by the state courts in order effectively to dispel
any opprobrium resulting from the accusation of obscenity. 96
S. Ct. at 1087-88.
In contrast, Justice Stevens argued that because "no matter what we do,
there will be no further proceeding in the underlying litigation," it was improper to grant leave to file. Id. at 1088.
180. Enomoto v. Spain, 96 S. Ct. 1424 (1976). The Court stayed,
pending further appeal, the effect of a federal district court decision
requiring California corrections officials to hold hearings before placing unruly prisoners in isolation. In contrast, Justice Stevens was "not persuaded
that the applicants ha[d] demonstrated a sufficient threat of irreparable injury to justify the exercise of this Court's power to issue an extraordinary
writ ....

"

Id.

